# CALOGA

> Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (France) records an imposed fine of €80,000 involving CALOGA in May 2025, concerning Art. 32 GDPR…

Canonical: https://cookiefines.eu/actions/16289/caloga-fine-france-2025
Last updated: 2026-10-18

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€80KCommission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés15 May 2025France

final

ePrivacy

Fine

CALOGA was fined EUR 80,000 for misleading users about their consent to data processing. The French data protection authority found that the company made it harder for users to refuse consent compared to accepting it. This case shows the importance of clear and fair consent practices in digital marketing.

Jurisdiction and applicable law

Enforcing jurisdiction

France · Geography does not establish applicable law.

Confirmed applicable legislation

- [EU General Data Protection Regulation](https://cookiefines.eu/enforcement?legal_regime=eu_gdpr)

Privacy topics

- [Cookies & tracking](https://cookiefines.eu/enforcement?topic=cookies_tracking)

What happened

CALOGA was fined for using misleading consent forms that made it easier to accept data processing than to refuse it.

Who was affected

Users who interacted with CALOGA's misleading consent forms were affected.

What the authority found

The authority decided that CALOGA's consent practices violated GDPR, as they relied on invalid consent due to misleading design.

Why this matters

This case highlights the need for companies to ensure that consent mechanisms are clear and easy to use. Businesses should avoid dark patterns that manipulate user choices.

## Key Facts

On 15 May 2025, Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés (France) issued a €80,000 fine against CALOGA. Recorded violation categories: cannot withdraw cookie consent and misleading banner messaging. GDPR provisions cited: Art. 32 GDPR, Art. 5(1)(e) GDPR, Art. 7(3) GDPR, Art. 4(11) GDPR. National provisions cited: L. 34-5 CPCE.

Recorded legal citations

Automatically processed

[Art. 32 GDPR](https://cookiefines.eu/gdpr/art-32-gdpr)Art. 32 GDPRSecurity of processing: organisations must implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to protect personal data.[Art. 5(1)(e) GDPR](https://cookiefines.eu/gdpr/art-5-1-e-gdpr)Art. 5(1)(e) GDPRCore data protection principles: lawfulness, fairness, transparency, purpose limitation, data minimisation, accuracy, storage limitation, integrity, and accountability.[Art. 7(3) GDPR](https://cookiefines.eu/gdpr/art-7-3-gdpr)Art. 7(3) GDPRConditions for valid consent: must be freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous. Consent can be withdrawn at any time.[Art. 4(11) GDPR](https://cookiefines.eu/gdpr/art-4-11-gdpr)

View original scraped data

Art. 4(11) GDPR

Art. 5(1)(e) GDPR

Art. 7(3) GDPR

Art. 32(GDPR)

Original imported citations before automated processing; the processing history does not establish independent verification.

National Law Articles

AI-identified

L. 34-5 CPCE

## Source checks

Secondary-source text retrieved.

Automated check recorded — 3 April 2026.

Processing notes: articles corrected, national law identified.

Retrieved text may be a secondary summary or an announcement. These automated statuses do not establish that the original decision was read or that the record received an independent legal review. [How we check sources](https://cookiefines.eu/about#source-checks)

[France enforcement](https://cookiefines.eu/countries/fr)[Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés actions](https://cookiefines.eu/countries/fr/cnil)[All CALOGA actions](https://cookiefines.eu/companies/caloga)

Full Legal Summary

Detailed

CALOGA (the controller) is a company that carries out commercial marketing operations, as well as acting as a data broker. The controller organizes its processing in four databases. One of the services the controller offered was to carry out e-mail marketing campaigns on behalf of companies. To do this, the controller used data collected by data brokers through entry forms for game contests or online product tests. These forms were misleading because the buttons to accept the use of data subjects’ data was much more prominent than those to reject it (this is also known as dark patterns). The controller relied on prior consent given for the initial collectors, and did not allow the data subject to withdraw consent as easily as they had given it. The DPA carried out an on-the-spot investigation of the company in 2022. On June 2024, the DPA rapporteur informed the controller of its breaches of Articles 5(1)(e), 6(1)(a) and 32 GDPR. The controller responded with two arguments- first, it could not foresee that the DPA’s conclusions, as there were no specific recommendations on direct marketing at the time of the inspection. The controller also argued that it had no role in obtaining consent when the data was first collected, and that the contractual and verification measures for the data collected were sufficient. The DPA considered that CALOGA acted as a joint controller for the purposes of transmitting the data to partners (these partners were considered joint controllers). The DPA first dismissed the controller’s foreseeability argument, stating there were rules applicable to direct marketing and consent for several years, and the recommendations on consent through cookies can serve as a guideline for general collection of consent. The DPA also considered the contractual and verifications measures taken by the controller as insufficient. According to Article 7 GDPR, the controller must prove that the data subject has consented to the data processing concerning them. If the controller processes data without collecting the data directly, it also must review the way in which its partners collect consent. The DPA found the controller’s reliance on prior consent unlawful; consent can only be freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous (Article 4(11) GDPR) if the data subject gives express consent after being given adequate information on what the data will be used for. This is supported by CJEU case law such as Planet49, in which the CJEU states that the user’s expression of wishes must relate precisely with the processing and cannot be inferred. Furthermore, any inappropriate influence preventing the data subject from exercising their will renders the consent invalid; this applies to the use of dark patterns, and therefore the controller could not rely on consent as a legal basis (Article 6(1)(a)), given that the conditions for consent were not met. The DPA considered the process of withdrawing consent problematic. National law transposing the \[https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2002/58/oj/eng ePrivacy Directive\] (\[https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/texte\_lc/LEGITEXT000006070987/ Code des postes et des communications électroniques\], Postal and Electronic Communications Code) allows the data subject to withdraw consent to direct marketing. In addition, Article 7(3) GDPR states that withdrawing consent must be as easy as giving it. Following this logic, the data subject should be able to withdraw consent from all databases and advertisers through one link, similarly to how they consented to it. However, unsubscribing through an e-mail link merely withdraws the consent for a specific advertiser or database. The controller did not respect the principle of storage limitation (Article 5(1)(e) GDPR). The controller applied a twelve month retention period from the last action taken by the data subject. This also included opening direct advertising emails. Following this period, the data was still stored for four years in an active database. The DPA considered this excessive. Finally, the DPA did not find a violation of Article 32 GDPR, as there were sufficient data security measures in place.

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## Violations (2)

Misleading Banner Messaging

critical

The cookie banner uses misleading language to trick or pressure users into accepting cookies (dark patterns).

Cannot Withdraw Cookie Consent

critical

No accessible mechanism exists for users to withdraw previously given cookie consent.

## Related Enforcement Actions (0)

No other enforcement actions found for CALOGA in FR

This is the only recorded action for this entity in this jurisdiction.

## Similar Cases

Enforcement actions with similar violations

[DPA case 38/2024 2024 · Autorité de Protection des Données](https://cookiefines.eu/actions/19031/dpa-case-38-2024-fine-belgium-2024)[DPA case 521.14877.15 2023 · DPA BlnBDI](https://cookiefines.eu/actions/18988/dpa-case-521-14877-15-fine-germany-2023)[DPA case 2021-31-4871 2023 · Datatilsynet (Norway)](https://cookiefines.eu/actions/18906/dpa-case-2021-31-4871-fine-denmark-2023)[DPA case 2021-31-5553 2023 · Datatilsynet (Norway)](https://cookiefines.eu/actions/18905/dpa-case-2021-31-5553-fine-denmark-2023)[Court of Justice of the European Union 2021 ·](https://cookiefines.eu/actions/18748/court-of-justice-of-the-european-union-fine-european-union-2021)

## Details

Fine Date

15 May 2025

Authority

Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés

Fine Amount

€80,000

GDPRhub ID

[gdprhub-9300](https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?curid=9300)

## Sources

[](https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/cnil/id/CNILTEXT000051660380)[](https://gdprhub.eu/index.php?curid=9300)

## About this data

Data: GDPRhub (noyb.eu)

Licensed under [CC BY-NC-SA 4.0](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/)

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Cookie relevance: 50%

Cite as: Cookie Fines. *CALOGA - France (2025)*. Retrieved from cookiefines.eu

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Last updated: 18 October 2026

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