AgID – €55,000 Fine (Italy, 2026)

The data controller for the case is a government body called the Agency for Digital Italy (AgID). AgID is tasked with driving the adoption of digital technologies in both government and the private sector. Additionally, AgID is Italy’s soon-to-be notification authority for the AI Act. The case revolves around two public online indexes of certified email addresses: the INI-PEC and the INAD. INI-PEC is the older of the two indexes and includes, among others, the email addressess of professionals (the data subjects). INAD was created by AgID in 2023 as provided by Italian lawSee Articles 3-bis, 6-quater and 6-quinquies, d. lgs. 82/2005. and functions as an index of “digital domiciles” (where data subjects are supposed to get certain important communications) for both professionals and other owners of a digital email address. Shortly after setting up the INAD index, AgID automatically included the addresses of professionals from the old INI-PEC index. As a result, the addresses automatically became the digital domicile for communications not related to the professional lives of the data subjects. Data subjects were given the option to opt-out of the inclusion in the INAD index. Some data subjects complainedIt is not clear whether the DPA started the investigation ex officio or due to the complaints. that this processing severely infringed on their privacy. As the DPA’s decision explains, it is not uncommon for professionals to give co-workers access to their professional email addresses, on the assumption that they will only be used for strictly professional communications. When the addressess became digital domiciles, third parties (such as public bodies) started using them for communications unrelated to the data subjects' personal lives - which occasionally led to unintended data disclosures. The data subjects also claimed that the controller had not informed them about the processing, which prevented them from opting out in a timely fashion. = == First of all, the DPA clarified that by including email addresses in the INAD index, the controller further processed personal data for a new purpose, incompatible with the original purpose of the processing (i.e.: the inclusion of email addresses in the older index). With regards to the duty of information, the controller pointed out that it contacted professional orders to inform them about the creation of the INAD index. In the context of these communications, the controller asked professional orders to inform the data subjects about this processing of personal data and about their right to opt out. The controller stated that it did not directly contact the data subjects via their email addresses, as it feared that its emails would have been mistaken as phishing or scamsThe DPA seems to have accepted this argument, as the decision contains no rebuttal; also see the "Comments" section on the lack of an injunction to inform data subjects).. The controller later launched a more effective information campaign with the help of other government bodies; however, this campaign only took place in 2025 - two years after addresses where included in the INAD index. == The DPA’s investigation also focused on a second issue, relative to the authentication procedure for digital domiciles: for a long time, a company (InfoCamere S.c.p.a.) was erroneously listed as a service provider for the INAD index. During the investigation, the controller confirmed that InfoCamere had no role in the processing of personal data. The controller also stated that it had contacted the actual service provider in order to correct the error and that the provider had done so with great delay. = The DPA held that until 2025, the controller had failed to inform the data subjects about the inclusion of their email address in the INAD index, in violation of Articles 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b), 5(2), 12, 14 and 25 GDPR. On these grounds, the DPA fined the controller €55,000. With regards to the erroneous indication of the service provider in the authentication screen, the DPA found that the mistake was isolated and that overall, the information provided during the procedure was still sufficient to clarify that AgID was the controller. On these grounds, the DPA found that the mistake did not, in and of itself, constitute a violation of the GDPR.