Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) – Court Ruling (Italy, 2026)

Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS, the controller) is the Italian National Institute for Social Security. In 2021, the DPA fined the controller €300,000 for its data processing activities linked to a subsidy given during the pandemic (also called “the COVID bonus”). The DPA found that the controller had postponed its second screening of verifying the eligibility of data subjects to a later stage, on the grounds that there was a need to immediately pay the subsidy. The controller considered that politicians did not fall under the scope of eligible data subjects, as they were already enrolled in a mandatory social security scheme. The controller processed their personal data from databases to cross reference them with data subjects who had applied for the subsidy. The DPA found a violation of several GDPR principles: the principle of lawfulness (Article 5(1)(a) GDPR), data minimisation (Article 5(1)(c) GDPR), accuracy (Article 5(1)(d) GDPR) and accountability (Articles 5(2) and 24 GDPR). According to the DPA, the controller had not limited the cross referencing to data subjects that had received the allowance, but to those whose applications had already been rejected. In addition, the DPA found a violation of Articles 25 and 35 GDPR, as the controller failed to conduct a data protection impact assessment (DPIA). The DPA ordered the controller to erase all personal data that had been processed unlawfully and to carry out a DPIA before resuming its processing activities. The controller appealed the decision to the Court of Rome, and argued that the DPA’s decision was unfounded. The court upheld the appeal and dismissed the DPA’s decision. The court considered that the controller had processed data subjects’ data lawfully, as it had limited the amount of data to what was necessary to verify data subjects’ eligibility. The court also considered that the processing posed a low risk for data subjects’ rights, as the data subjects’ names were not disclosed. The DPA appealed this decision to the court. The court dismissed the appeal. The court first stated that the controller processed the data lawfully under Article 6(1)(e) GDPR (public interest) and Article 6(3)(b) GDPR. While the controller processed data of specific data subjects (politicians), the court stated that national law allowed the controller to check the eligibility of all data subjects applying for the subsidy. The controller had also obtained the personal data through public databases provided by the Chambers of Parliament and Ministry of the Interior. The court also dismissed the DPA’s arguments on data minimisation (Article 5(1)(c) GDPR). The court stated that the principle of data minimisation is not absolute, and must be balanced with other interests at stake.See also C-268/21, Norra Stockholm Bygg AB https://infocuria.curia.europa.eu/tabs/affair?lang=en&sort=AFF_NUM-DESC&searchTerm=%22C-268%2F21%22&publishedId=C-268%2F21 The court took into consideration the fact that the data was publicly available and the need to quickly verify a high number of applications during a state of emergency. According to the court, there was also no other way to check applications still under review, and concluded that there was an overriding public interest in carrying out the verification process quickly. Finally, the court considered that the controller complied with Article 25 GDPR, as it processed data lawfully and in compliance with Article 5(1)(c) GDPR. In terms of data accuracy (Article 5(1)(d) GDPR), the court dismissed the DPA’s argument that the controller’s system did not eliminate the risk of “homocodes” (identical tax numbers between two or more people). The court considered that the data collected by the Chambers of Parliament and Ministry of Interior were presumed to be accurate. The court also noted that national law foresees the risk of “homocodes” and sets specific procedures in such cases, and that no actual inaccuracies were found in the controller’s verification process. Finally, the court did not find a violation of Article 35 GDPR. The court stated that the controller did not have the obligation to conduct a DPIA, as it did not meet all the necessary criteria. According to the court, the DPA failed to explain the potential high risks of large scale processing that would have justified the need for a DPIA. Given the previous dismissed arguments, the court considered that the controller had also complied with the principle of accountability (Articles 5(2) and 24 GDPR).