Court case PL. ÚS 11/2025-116 – Court Ruling (Slovakia, 2025)

On 14 May 2025, a group of 32 members of the National Council of the Slovak Republic (the proposers) submitted a proposal to the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic challenging Act No. 109/2025 Coll. The Act, which entered into effect on 1 June 2025, required NGOs, associations, and international organisations with annual income exceeding €35,000 to submit a financial report. The report had to list all income sources and expenditures. It required identifying contributors who provided monetary support exceeding €5,000 per year. The reports were to be published in the public section of the financial statements register. The law also removed previous protections guaranteeing donor anonymity under the Foundations Act and the Funds Act. The proposers objected to the law on several grounds. They claimed that publishing donor names violated privacy and data protection rights under the [https://www.prezident.sk/upload-files/46422.pdf Constitution], the [https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/d/echr/convention_ENG Convention], and the [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf EU Charter], and conflicted with EU rules on free movement of capital. They argued that the law violated freedom of association by imposing detailed reporting and public disclosure obligations that could deter donors and limit NGO activities. They also contended that the legislative process was unconstitutional, as debate in the National Council was limited and curtailed, preventing meaningful discussion. Additionally, they requested that the Court refer a question to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling. On 11 August 2025, the Public Defender of Rights (the Ombudsman) also filed a motion to challenge the law. The Ombudsman emphasised that NGOs, especially those promoting human rights, perform a public watchdog function and therefore require protection from disproportionate state interference. He argued that the disclosure obligations were not necessary to prevent crime, as competent authorities already had access to relevant information. Public disclosure of donor identities and contributions could threaten personal honour, privacy, and financial autonomy, and could deter participation in civil society. The Ombudsman also highlighted that classifying NGOs as obligated entities under the Information Act blurred the distinction between private law entities and public authorities. The National Council justified the law as a measure to increase transparency in NGO financing, strengthen public trust, improve oversight, and prevent money laundering, corruption, and misuse of funds. It argued that disclosure obligations were limited to NGOs receiving significant funding and that existing reporting requirements were clarified rather than newly imposed. The law was also intended to align NGO reporting with obligations of public authorities and political organisations. It stressed that disclosure obligations were consistent with international standards, including OECD and MONEYVAL recommendations, and were less invasive than comparable measures in other countries. The Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic held that the Act was incompatible with Article 19(2) of the Slovak Constitution and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the convention). It first examined whether the law interfered with the privacy of NGO contributors, including a potential impact on personal data, reputation, and honor; then it considered the effect on NGOs’ own fundamental rights; and finally assessed the constitutional implications of extending the obligations of the Information Act to NGOs. The Court emphasized that privacy protects individuals from undue interference in private life, encompassing professional and social activities, autonomy, development, and relationships. Legal entities may also claim limited privacy rights, though these are narrower due to their more purposeful activities. The legislation interfered with these rights by requiring NGOs to collect and publicly disclose contributors’ names, identifying information for legal entities, and contribution amounts, depriving contributors of control over their personal information and intruding into private law relationships. Legitimate Aims and the Proportionality Assessment Although the government cited transparency and the fight against crime, including money laundering and terrorism financing, as legitimate aims, the Court found these objectives too general to justify broad public disclosure. Transparency is primarily relevant for oversight of public power and funds, not private contributions to NGOs. There was also no evidence of a concrete or substantial risk of criminal activity necessitating disclosure, and previous law already allowed oversight with anonymization. Applying the proportionality test, the Court concluded that requiring NGOs to maintain records could be appropriate, but public disclosure was unnecessary. The legislation failed to specify the purpose, scope, or duration of data processing or to demonstrate a balance between transparency and privacy. Inconsistencies in government reasoning—asserting the need to identify contributors publicly while acknowledging many could not be identified—further rendered the law disproportionate. Impact on NGOs’ Informational Self-Determination and Freedom of Association The law similarly interfered with NGOs’ rights under Article 19(2) of the Constitution by restricting their informational self-determination. It imposed disclosure obligations without specific justification, making the interference disproportionate in light of the legislature’s stated objectives. Regarding freedom of association under Article 29 of the constitution, the Court noted that maintaining basic records does not impose an excessive burden; however, mandatory public disclosure risked deterring contributions, potentially impeding establishment, operation, or survival of associations. The law also failed to account for differences among NGOs. Impact on NGOs’ Informational Self-Determination and Freedom of Association The Court assessed NGOs’ inclusion as obligated entities under the Information Act when receiving public funds. Article 26(5) (Right of access to information and obligations of public authorities) of the Constitution primarily applies to public authorities or entities with public-law character; NGOs, as private-law entities, lack this character, and public-interest activities do not convert them into public authorities. The law imposed substantial administrative burdens, particularly on smaller NGOs, including responding to unfounded or partially denied requests, risking interference with core activities and potential harassment by third parties. It also discriminated against NGOs by imposing obligations not applied to other private entities receiving public funds. Public authorities already have access to such information, making the extension to NGOs unnecessary and undermining their autonomy, effectively treating them as public-law entities in violation of Article 29(4) of the constitution (Autonomy and separation of associations from the state). Unconstitutional Extension of Information Act Obligations to NGOs and EU Law Considerations The Court further considered whether requiring NGOs to keep and publish contributor records—including donors from other EU Member States or third countries—interfered with the free movement of capital under EU law. Donations, loans, and credits fall within capital movements, and national measures restricting them, even if non-discriminatory, may constitute obstacles. Although transparency in association financing is a legitimate objective under EU law, it does not automatically justify restrictions on capital flows or interference with fundamental rights under the Charter, including privacy (Articles 7–8) and freedom of association (Article 12). As the legislation already violated the Constitution and Convention, further assessment under the Charter or referral to the Court of Justice was unnecessary, rendering EU law concerns moot. Review of the Legislative Process and Procedural Constitutionality Finally, the Court emphasized that constitutional review ensures adherence to constitutional principles, not appeal of procedural choices. Only gross procedural violations affecting constitutional rights, particularly of parliamentary minorities, can render a law unconstitutional. Here, opposition MPs had ample opportunities to provide oral and written comments, substantial criticism was recorded, and there was no evidence of obstruction justifying shortened debate. While hasty and politically strategic, the legislative process did not violate constitutional procedural rights. Consequently, Act No. 109/2025 Coll. and related provisions cease to be effective.